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Abstract: This paper is about how human services work people into place and how places are 
reworked by people. As an (auto)ethnographic research on community based services for 
“developmental disability”—seen as technologies for making social cohesion and 
development—it discusses rewards and risks when tooling knowledge to make people free. 
 




Social Cohesion is as venerable a sociological concept as there ever was, and is defined 
in practice as “the ongoing process of developing a community of shared values…based on a 
sense of trust, hope, and reciprocity” (Dayton-Johnson, 2003). It has been used to research the 
effectiveness of community organizations in economic development (Borgos & Douglas, 1996), 
of local cultures in fostering civic volunteerism (Sharon, 2003), and the dis/integrative effects of 
ethnic diversity (Healy, 2007). Yet, there remains an absence of social cohesion research on 
community services for the “developmentally disabled” (“DD”). One aim of this paper is to 
address this gap.  
By “DD,” I mean what has been called “mental retardation,” “feeblemindedness,” and 
before that “idiocy.” In the past, it included vagrancy (Foucault, 2006; Hacking, 1998). In the 
present, it includes also categories like autism. I say “DD” primarily because it is the signifier 
used by the state of Nebraska to qualify people for treatment in human service spaces, such as 
group homes and sheltered workshops. 
Though silent on social cohesion, research on “DD” has engaged with a related concept, 
“social capital”—the fabric of social networks which make social cohesion possible. In journals 
devoted to disability studies as well as rehabilitation and integrated education, research 
endeavors to account for social capitals present or absent between communities and families with 
“DD” children (Chenoweth & Stehlik, 2004), or between “DD” students and their universities 
(Farmakopoulou & Watson, 2003). Elsewhere it is theoretically explicated as a tool for 
measuring and strategically intervening in the development of a “DD” individual’s social 
network (Potts, 2005; Ward & Baker, 2005). The practical aim is generally to generate more 
opportunities for things like integrated employment (Potts, 2005; Ward & Baker, 2005), and to 
encourage policy makers to be more inclusive about how social capital’s parameters are to be 
defined (Pavey, 2006). 
These discussions posit an affinity between sociological discussions of social capital with 
the long-standing missions of deinstitutionalization, community integration and social inclusion 
(Bates & Davis, 2004; Partington, 2005; Potts, 2005). These texts then adapt social capital for 
 use with an already extensive knowledge base for implementing community service systems for 
“DD” populations, a long standing mission of making social cohesion. “Over the past 30 years 
an informal network of writers…have shown how support can be provided so that people with 
disabilities can be employed rather than attend a sheltered workshop, live in their own home 
rather than in a hostel, and participate in friendships and community life with a diverse array of 
citizens” (Bates & Davis, 2004, p. 196). Such hegemonic human service epistemologies like 
Normalization/Social Role Valorization (SRV) do not specifically address the issue of social 
capital, but do seek to add value to roles disabled people play in society (Partington, 2005, p. 
247). It must be noted that this affinity is true not only of research sympathetic to SRV, but to 
research from the social model of disability as well (Pavey, 2006; Partington, 2005). Pavey’s 
(2006) article in Disability & Society argues for the social model of disability not to refuse the 
concepts of social capital for its capitalist elements, but for an inclusive definition and 
application. This mutual affinity to a third thing by two ideologically opposed epistemologies 
makes sense if one is open to the possibility that Normalization is misrecognized as simply a 
“medical model.” 
While these paradigms for making inclusion or integration out of “DD” practically beg 
questions like, “What do we mean by our community?” (Partington, 2005), the position of this 
paper is that it may be more fruitful to ask, what do we do as we mean our community to be? 
Historical studies draw attention to how public policies for institutionalization of deviant 
populations in places like France, the United States, and in my case Nebraska, now rightly and 
broadly considered inhumane, were not in spite of a will to social cohesion but rather in the 
pursuit of maintaining or safeguarding notions of it (Trent, 1994; Hacking, 1998; DeKraai, 
2002). Care for social cohesion became linked with control very early on in the state schools for 
“feebleminded” youth, says Trent (1994), and this linkage has not been severed by the service 
systems of today. 
I use a grounded post-structuralist approach combining tools of ethnography and 
discourse analysis. Post-structuralist because I use analytic schemas adapted from a triad of 
scholars, Michel Foucault, Ian Hacking, and Deleuze and Guattari, in order to trace the trajectory 
of two “DD” people through the state of Nebraska’s community service system. Examples from 
Nebraska are instructive for it is there where Normalization based community services for “DD” 
populations in the United States first came into being (Schalock, 2002). Ethnographic because 
this research involved three years inside Nebraska’s community service system, first as a human 
service worker  in 2002 and 2004; and then formally as ethnographer  in 2007. In the next 
section I cover some recent discussion on community services for “DD” before moving on to the 
two cases at hand. In light of these cases I will discuss how social cohesion is better understood 
as a process of struggle over its terms of constitution rather than something intrinsically 
reciprocating and trustworthy.  
“The Group Home Problem” 
A group home is a residence where three to six “DD” individuals live who are expected 
to “work toward independence” and who are “supported and reported” by human service staff in 
their progress on independent living skills and maintaining good behavior (Croft, 1999; 
Levinson, 2005). Recent research literature on group homes for “DD” point to paradoxes of 
 power. Often an individual’s “choices” are determined by bureaucratic contingency so that, for 
example, where one “chooses” to live or what housemates to live with may be merely a factor of 
where there is an available bed (MacEachen & Munby, 1996). The mission to free a people and 
make spaces for their independence furthermore comes into tension with an impulse to impose 
and enforce proper models and uses of freedom and to erect restrictions around an individual in 
the form of “safeguards” against the risk posed to their self and to others as vulnerable and 
unpredictable people (Crichton, 1998; Duvdevaney, Ben-Zur, & Ambar). Levinson’s 
ethnographic paper analyses this instructively from a Neo-Foucaldian point of view as not a 
problem of power but rather a dilemma of freedom. A group home is not intrinsically oppressive, 
but is merely a technology intended for making a liberal model of citizenship work on/for a kind 
of people (Levinson, 2005). Unlike Levinson, however, I would submit this work is not clinical, 
but colonial, as it is performed whether or not it is invited by the citizen concerned.  
Group homes are then places for a discipline of development. Disciplinary power “brings 
together citizenship and embodied identity with perpetual observation, writing, an unclear 
distinction between punishment and reward, projection of the psyche, the division between 
normal and abnormal….and fits embodied identity together with political power” (Foucault, 
2006, p. 56). Discipline is the ‘anatamo-political pole of development’ which “centers on the 
individual as a speaking, working, procreating entity” (Hacking, 2002, p. 112). Bio-politics is the 
other pole which “focuses on the species body…the biological processes of a population in 
statistical form” (Foucault, as cited in Hacking, 2002, p. 112). Community services can be 
considered as an example of “the whole cluster of intermediary relations which link these poles 
together” (Hacking, 2002, p. 112). It is with this in mind I wish now to proceed with the two 
cases with which this paper is concerned. 
The Traces of Two Placements 
 
I consider the following two cases as singularities within a bio-political field of social 
cohesion. These two cases, Merciful Black and Zero President1, exemplify the ongoing 
consequences of community care, entombment/containment and interpretive development. I 
explain this taxonomic intervention by way of discussion. Quoted material is either speech I 
witnessed in the field or text from documents I encountered. 
Temples of Entombment for Merciful Black  
Merciful Black was in her early childhood dually diagnosed as “having mild mental 
retardation” and a swathe of “behavioral disorders.” She resents her position in Nebraska’s 
human service system, whose group home network she entered in 2001. She refers to her group 
home as “the nuthouse.” She voices loudly her desire “not [to] live in a group home no more,” 
but she is not her own legal guardian and so has no legal authority over her processes of 
placement. She uses what powers are at her disposal to struggle against her placement, and these 
struggles are recorded onto hundreds of “incident reports” of her verbal and physical violence 
and aggression. These aggressions are generally directed against the property of staff or a 
roommate. She sometimes throws fists at their bodies, but more often throws rocks at staff’s cars. 
Yet, for all of this she has never been reported exhibiting violent behavior in public when 
 enjoying her “independent time in the community”—a daily four hour privilege (according to her 
case records this was once an 8 hour privilege, also daily).  
As a regime of group home discipline, Merciful Black’s can be read as processes of 
entombment and containment. Her placements began with a foster family in North Omaha, a 
low-income African-American portion of Nebraska’s largest city. As a teenager she constructed 
a social network vested in peripheral street gang affiliations. Social service workers intervened, 
and her foster mother placed Merciful in a group home. From there, and over the next seven 
years, Merciful’s placement processes drew her progressively further from the geography and 
culture of her community of identification—where she “was born an raiz’d in tha hood,” as she 
describes herself to me at a barbecue.  
Few of Merciful’s human service workers and decision makers doubt her ability to live 
outside of a group home. Key decision makers on her “individual support team,” however, are 
nervous about the kind of people she seeks for association. Merciful’s guardian, a woman who 
lives out of state in Texas and was recommended to Merciful as a guardian by her social services 
case worker, advises me to stay away from Merciful’s “low rent” friends. Merciful’s social 
worker expresses similar views. In Merciful’s case book it is recorded that “these friends are a 
bad influence on Merciful, and will take advantage of her,” although the only example provided 
involves an episode where Merciful takes chicken from her group home to eat it at her friend’s 
house. 
With Merciful, there are many episodes. But how her “independent time” functions in her 
case is telling. The following narrative is assembled and summarized from accounts in her case 
book as well as my own ethnographic engagement with Merciful, her friends, and her service 
workers.  
Merciful’s friends invite her to a party. Support staff are directed by her “individual 
service program” to drive her nowhere other than medical appointments, her guardian, or other 
community service settings. To use her “independent time” Merciful must “independently” 
access the community. By this time Merciful has been placed in a group home in West Omaha, 
across town from “the hood.” To meet her friends Merciful must take the hour long bus ride. She 
does. But the bus system in Omaha is spare; with most bus lines closing early in the evening. She 
will need someone with a car to drive her back and her friends seldom have access to a car.  
Half an hour before her independent time expires, around 11:30 pm, Merciful calls the 
group home to request a ride. The staff on duty cannot leave Merciful’s housemates 
unsupervised. Merciful calls the group home manager who advises a ride home from staff is “not 
part of her program.” Merciful misses her curfew and loses her “independent time” for a month. 
She becomes angry and, returning “home,” cycles into breaking things, shouting, throwing rocks 
at a staff’s car, and is eventually placed in a prone floor restraint. 
Merciful is some time later invited out again. Planning ahead, she asks staff members if 
they will be able to drive her. The answer is programmatically “no.” Merciful contacts her social 
worker, who reminds Merciful she is responsible for her own transport when using “independent 
time.” Merciful offers to do extra chores to earn money for a taxi or to pay staff for gas, but she 
 is told she must earn money from a real job or at the sheltered workshop (which pays below 
minimum wage). The social worker’s contact record reads: “Spoke to Manager. Merciful did 
well at home…made the decision on her own not to go on the bus because the buses quit running 
at 5 pm and she would not have a way home. No physical aggression.”  
Merciful nominally has independent time and is nominally permitted to use it how she 
wishes, but a combination of contingencies - the Omaha bus lines, the location of her placement, 
the social identity of her friends as “bad influences” in the eyes of human service authorities - 
become a constellation of programmatic points which prevent her from realizing her time of 
independence and circulating her social capital in a manner and with a community meaningful to 
her. The program wants her desires to steer toward particular social capitals and models of 
responsible conduct. A responsible decision for Merciful, in the eyes of her social worker, is to 
learn docility and acceptance of her identification as being in need of a group home. 
Similar episodes are repeated until one evening Merciful pins her staff to the floor while 
one of her housemates smashes over the worker a glass coffee table; shattering both kneecaps of 
the young woman concerned. Merciful is re-placed. Her new group home is in a suburb of the 
state capital another 60 miles west from her identified home. Merciful calls this “exile.” 
Merciful’s guardian says in the contact record, “This can be a new start.” The “new start” is an 
ominous nine miles from the “Nebraska State Developmental Center.” She loses all 
“independent time.” 
The Intepretive Development of Zero President 
Zero is a much needed counter-example. He has not been placed and re-placed ever 
closer to the heart of human service bureaucracy and so maintained in an entombed/contained 
state. He has lived in the same home since 1978 more or less adopted by a foster family, which 
has enabled him to claim the terms of his identity and constructively challenge the roles expected 
of him by Nebraska’s community services system. And no shortage of support has come from his 
adoptive father figure, Peaceful Ruler2. Peaceful worked, among other things (pastor, poet, 
professor, activist), as an Intake Officer for Nebraska’s community service system during its 
formative years of the late 1970s. In that capacity, he became alerted to Zero.  
Zero was raised in a Polish-American working class neighborhood in South Omaha. His 
parents were both “DD” as well as one of his two brothers. He himself is diagnosed as having 
“mild mental retardation” and “ADHD,” was 17 when his parents passed away. The eldest of his 
two brothers, “very capable,” was working and trying to keep things together for his siblings, but 
to no avail. The house fell into severe disrepair: broken toilets, clots of trash; cockroaches 
crawling all about. Now Zero’s other brother, also “DD,” would have nothing to do with 
community services and as his own guardian chose to live the next ten years with “thugs” who 
exploited his Social Security check. Zero, still being a minor, required by law some kind of 
human service placement. Peaceful organized foster homes for him, but removed him from each 
one when he witnessed signs of entombment/containment on follow-up visits. Eventually out of 
foster options and afraid to move the emotionally distraught individual, Peaceful took Zero to 
stay in his home, at least for a few months until he was emotionally stabilized. During this time, 
 Peaceful advocated a place for Zero at public school and taught him, among other things, how to 
read. By the time a few months of stabilization had passed, Zero began to call Peaceful “dad.”  
Peaceful says, “…It just became clear we [he and his partner] were having a ball 
parenting. So I went to child protection services and I said, ‘You know, we’ve kind of invested a 
lot of time with the boy. And because he wasn’t a client we weren’t treating him like a client, we 
always treated him like a kid.” Peaceful and his partner became Zero’s family. Eventually Zero’s 
“DD” brother decided to leave the “thug life” and moved in with the Peaceful family. Thirty-two 
years later, Zero says if Peaceful had not found him, he would have “fallen through the cracks.” 
Zero now works for a recycling facility built on grant money for “DD” people to have a 
place of employment that offers valued work in an environment of “dignity and respect.” Though 
it is a “segregated” workplace it is not a sheltered workshop such as Merciful is compelled to 
attend, i.e., it is “real work for real pay.” Yet, as Zero’s work skills developed in this 
environment, it became imperative of his vocational staff to encourage him to try and seek 
“competitive employment in the community.” After seven attempts, either sufficient support was 
lacking, or, as Peaceful suggests, Zero’s “ADHD” proved too strong a force. In any case, Zero 
could not perform in the “competitive” workforce. The stream of “failures” wounded so 
intensely his psyche that, after its seventh repetition, he availed himself of a psychic self-healing 
process with a therapist which lasted several months.  
Instead of trying an eighth time for competitive work, Zero began to advocate for more 
responsibilities at the recycling facility; not only for himself, but for his co-workers as well. A 
new position was carved for him to train new workers on machines. He was also taught basic 
word processing skills. He broadened his advocacy and began to organize an employee 
association so that the “DD” workers of his recycling facility might claim greater authority over 
the work-space and slowly take over the responsibilities of support staff. He came downstairs 
one day during my fieldwork, as I was dusting Peaceful’s study, to share with me the progress of 
his work: 
“Decisions lie behind all the actions that people take….the forman (sic) 
coaching…described something that ‘conveyed valued people from where they are to 
where they want to go’….but many coaches\ forman (sic) give their followers more 
information than they can digest at one time….the rationale is that ‘we don’t have time to 
this in ‘digestble’ (sic) for” [text breaks off]. 
Here Zero rethinks “development” as something which need not be a firm application of 
hierarchical models for measuring workplace achievement. Work need be neither “competitive,” 
nor “integrated” to be dignifying. Zero’s experience is that social cohesion is best made where he 
makes not only community work, but also works an affirmative meaning of community through 
his labor and the application of this labor at his desired pace and toward a tangible outcome. “I 
don’t want any landfills,” he says.  
A Coil of Social (In)Coherencies 
 My taxonomic intervention, “entombment/containment” and “interpretive development,” 
is adapted from A Thousand Plateaus (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 150). For clarity, I 
reproduce one of Deleuze & Guattari’s diagrams below as Figure 1. 






Once the mission of forging a cohesion called “community” is declared, the question 
must remain as to who has identified its signs and values for belonging, imputed their absence 
upon whom, and to what consequence? Christopher Lasch, twice in his work, The True and Only 
Heaven: Progress and Its Critics (1991), quotes a 1932 statement made by Christian ethicist, 
Reinold Niebuhr, “If social cohesion is impossible without coercion, and coercion is impossible 
without the creation of social injustice, and the destruction of injustice is impossible without the 
use of further coercion, are we not in an endless cycle of social conflict?” (Lasch, 1991, p. 377).  
Universal Ideologies and Radical Contingencies 
Although each case here is different from the other they both have in common the coil of 
social cohesion upon which their processes of place are manifest. Both live in spaces consequent 
to a Normalization movement which began Nebraska’s deinstitutionalization process in 1968 
with promises of the “return of the mentally retarded to society as productive citizens” (Terry, 
1968). It was a promise of progress—the economic progress of earning independence, the 
cultural progress of performing the signs for valued citizenship, and the ethical progress of 
implementing right knowledge for practices of making-up this progressive citizenship through 
humanist values and a communitarian political praxis (Schalock, 2002).  
(1) “The Center or the Signifier": in this case developmental progress. (2) “The Temple or Palace with 
priests and bureaucrats”:  offices of health and human services, the Nebraska State Developmental 
Center; the direction toward which Merciful Black is being pulled. (3) “…the sign referring to other 
signs on the same circle or on different circles”: epistemological and practical struggles over ‘what 
community means.’ (4) “The interpretive development of signifier into signified which…reimparts the 
signifier”: Zero President moving away from the Center; Merciful Black moving toward the Center. (5) 
“The expiatory animal; the blocking of the line of flight”: The contained element of Merciful Black, 
blocked from fully identifying with her community. (6) “The scapegoat or the negative sign of the line 
of flight”: the act of escape Merciful would need to fully enter into her desired regime of coherency. 
 
 
 Problems with Normalization-based community services in Nebraska became manifest 
(Schalock, 2002) when, despite the promises, the reality sunk in that not all “mentally retarded” 
people can or want to work in the “competitive” workplace and/or obtain the culture of 
independence community experts and humanists imagined as desirable for them. This 
compounded with the structural reality of globalization as the 1980s onward saw many of the 
manual labor jobs traditionally pursued by “higher functioning DD” individuals moved out of 
state. Responding to this stagnation the State of Nebraska assumed tighter control over the 
service system to account for the dollars spent on it; to encourage people to be made to move 
through the system more measurably and if not moving be accounted for and treated by a form of 
behavioral discipline believed able to make them move. As happened with the state schools for 
“feebleminded” youth, “Well intentioned advocates of productivity through education became 
unintentionally the mediators of disabling, unproductive institutionalization” (Trent, 1994, p. 3).  
Merciful’s service workers do not see themselves as a conspiracy of control, but rather as 
agents of protection from immanent pathways into the criminal justice system. But 
Normalization here begets frustrating consequences in part because the articulation of its system 
will not affirm Merciful’s work toward becoming her desired identity. There is no allowance for 
normalization into ghetto life. This omission becomes the commission of 
entombment/containment when it pathologizes not only Merciful’s resistance to these blockages, 
but also when it actively and un/intentionally erects more blockages by pathologizing of her 
behavior. They should advocate for more thorough systems of mass-transit, or really teach 
Merciful to drive such as the social model of disability would (Oliver 1990). Yet, while the 
social model of disability might be more efficacious in practical terms here, theoretically it 
would need tweaking. The social model counts as the voices of disability those who self identify 
as disabled and resist structures of normalization in that name. But Merciful does not self-
identify as disabled; and especially not as having “DD,” the people who belong to “the nuthouse” 
with which she refuses to identify. When with her “non-DD” friends she actively obscures any 
part of her past and her identity related to her “behavioral disorder” or her “mild mental 
retardation.” She tries, and often succeeds at “passing.” In a sense she truly pursues 
normalization, and with it desires the Social Role Valorization of a kind of ghetto life.  
For Zero, the discipline of place was parental rather than programmatic. “You won’t do 
your homework, then no dinner!” is one strategy Peaceful shares for how he set Zero on the 
trajectory of literacy. Here too is coercion, and in the eyes of some case workers I have come to 
know it would constitute abuse. Yet, it was this tactic of parental coercion which helped create 
the very conditions and skills necessary for Zero’s present approach to self-advocacy—a self-
advocacy he performs outside the purview of “DD peoples’ parliaments” but on the very place of 
his community work where he now sees himself as a leader in the sense of a “monk” or a 
“coach.” The social model of disability desires and encourages people to consider or make 
outcomes such as Zero’s (Goodley & Lawthom, 2005). But, like Merciful’s case, Zero’s comes 
as a consequence of Nebraska’s Normalization Movement. When Peaceful Ruler became Zero’s 
paternal touchstone in 1978, he had been active as an intake officer and community advocate for 
Nebraska’s Normalization based community services. And, in fact, Peaceful Ruler was close to 
key leaders of Nebraska’s Normalization movement so that Zero’s legal guardian is no less than 
the woman cited as the “silent but powerful conscience of Nebraska’s Normalization movement” 
 (Schalock, 2002). And so, the question strikes me, is there more to Normalization than a 
caricature of medicalization and state control? 
Coda 
“The recent enthusiasm for social capital,” says one discussion vis-à-vis a resurgent 
popularity in the work of Durkheim, “Is an example of a theory whose rhetoric is often more 
liberating than its application” (Kishner & Sterk, 2005, p. 1142). Social cohesion paradigms 
tempt policy makers and research workers because its terms appear to render the desirable 
mechanisms of community transparent. While these tools may be useful in some cases making 
visible certain needs or desires, they run always the risk of imposing a form, or rendering 
invisible and unaddressed that which fails forms where personhood is accounted through 
universals of good or bad, black or white, stagnant or developed, included or excluded, valorized 
or devalued.  
Universal models for making social cohesion out of a “DD” population fail not only 
because the variables of an individual “DD” case are too multiple and contingent to fit into a 
single mold for making community work, but also because resilient individuals of a population 
which has come to be defined by its very lack of development will differentially and actively 
defy disservices received in the name of making through state discipline this absent thing. 
Another sign is needed; one less ready to point to individual villains, whether “DD,” an 
epistemology, a state, or staff.  
Seeing how community services can wind people into ever tighter networks of police, it 
may be time to let the coils of social cohesion unravel just a bit; to let individuals unravel it in a 
manner which makes sense to them—whether it is normalization into the ghetto, or rethinking 
the orders of valued work. Though “DD” is not madness, the wisdom may be the same. “[I]t is 
this circle that antipsychiatry undertakes to unravel…giving the individual the task and right of 
taking his madness to the limit, of taking it right to the end, in an experience to which others may 
contribute, but never in the name of a power conferred on them by their reason or normality” 
(Foucault, 2006, p. 346). Sociology just as well as human services has been down coils of social 
coherency many times before. Civilization is not borne of bloodless motion. 
“My consolation and my happiness are to be found in service of all that lives, because the 
divine essence is the sum total of all life.”  M. Gandhi (quoted from Peaceful Ruler’s 
journal of daily meditations). 
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Endnotes 
1Merciful Black and Zero President are pseudonyms. 
2Peaceful Warrior is a pseudonym. 
  
